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I.  INTRODUCTION 
April 18, 1861 was a fateful day in American history.  On that day, 
a talented fifty-four year old army officer was offered the command of 
the Union Army.1  But on the same day, he learned that his home state of 
Virginia had decided to secede from the Union.2  Although a Southerner, 
he was not enthusiastic about the institution of slavery.3  He opposed 
secession, saying that the Framers would never have “exhausted so 
much labor, wisdom, and forbearance” in forming the Union “if it was 
intended to be broken up by every member of the [Union] at will.”4  Yet, 
in the end, he decided that his primary allegiance was to his State, 
 
∗ Sho Sato Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. 
 1. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR ERA 280-81 (1988). 
 2. Id. at 281. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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proclaiming “I cannot raise my hand against my birthplace, my home, 
my children.”5  Five days later, the officer—one Robert E. Lee—became 
the Commander in Chief of the Virginia military, and within a month he 
was a Confederate general.6  If he had accepted the offer to head the 
Union Army, the course of the Civil War might have been far different. 
Robert E. Lee’s decision exemplified the choice facing Southerners 
at the start of the Civil War:  was their primary allegiance to their home 
states or to the United States of America?  According to the foremost 
historical study of the constitutional evolution of citizenship, “the Civil 
War was a struggle over the nature of the community created in 1789—a 
bloody contest over allegiance.”7  Thus, “[t]he lines now were sharply 
drawn between those who stressed the primacy of the state communities 
of allegiance and those who insisted that the Union had created one 
nation and one people.”8  After the enactment of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, the status of Americans “with respect to the 
states depended upon this national statute and upon their own choice or 
residence, and it could not be impeached or violated by state action.”9  In 
short, the Civil War itself and the ensuing Fourteenth Amendment 
resolved the previously contested issue of the relative priority of state 
and national allegiance.10 
A corollary flows naturally from this observation.  Any remaining 
constitutional question about rights of states to secede was laid to rest:  if 
allegiance to the national government was primary, action by states 
could not cut the bond between Americans and the national government.  
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment is explicit.  First, anyone born or 
naturalized within the jurisdiction of the United States is a citizen of the 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 280-81. 
 7. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 340 
(1978).  The Development of American Citizenship remains the leading historical treatment of the 
subject.  DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION:  POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF 
THE AMERICAN UNION, 1774-1804 (2009), adds a valuable perspective on the development of 
nationalism during the early years of the Republic. 
 8. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 340.  
 9. Id. at 343. 
 10. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL:  ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 93 
(2010) (“Until after the Civil War, there existed no commonly agreed understanding of citizenship 
or of the rights it entailed.”).  Of course, this is not to say states have lost all significance to 
Americans.  As Bruce Ackerman says: 
No need to exaggerate.  I don’t suggest that Americans think of themselves as citizens of 
a unitary nation-state on the model of, say, nineteenth-century France.  We remain 
Pennsylvanians or Oregonians as well as Americans, but the textual promise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has finally become a living reality:  we are Americans first. 
Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1749-50 (2007). 
2
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United States and of the state in which he or she resides.11  State 
citizenship is derivative and cannot be controlled by the state itself.  
Second, no state can deprive any American citizen of the privileges or 
immunities of citizenship—which means, for example, that the state 
cannot deprive a citizen of U.S. citizenship by seceding.12  The 
Privileges or Immunities Clause explicitly prohibits a state from 
depriving citizens of their federal rights, and secession would be a 
blatant violation of that prohibition. 
The implications of the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause for secession should be obvious to anyone who 
understands how sovereignty, citizenship, and the right to national 
protection were interwoven in antebellum thought.  But even among 
constitutional scholars, such knowledge is not universal, and the law 
review literature does not directly address this point.   
The broader significance of the Fourteenth Amendment for the 
nature of the Union—and specifically, for the issue of secession—has 
been insufficiently appreciated by constitutional scholars.  For instance, 
one leading constitutional scholar has pointed to the secession issue as a 
key example of the irrelevance of constitutional text: 
Before the Civil War, there was a lively and inconclusive debate over 
whether the Constitution permitted states to secede.  There is no longer 
 
 11. “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1.  This language derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), with a 
change from excepting persons “subject to any foreign power” and “Indians not taxed” with “not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”  Many supporters of the statute believed that the 
Thirteenth Amendment made blacks citizens when it abolished slavery.  See Robert J. Kaczorowski, 
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
863, 899 n.157 (1986) (citing United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1867) as 
exemplifying this view).  For example, Senator Benjamin Wade said: 
I have always believed that every person, of whatever race or color, who was born within 
the United States was a citizen of the United States; but by the decisions of the courts 
there has been a doubt thrown over that subject; and if the Government should fall into 
the hands of those who are opposed to the views that some of us maintain, those who 
have been accustomed to take a different view of it, they may construe the provision in 
such a way as we do not think it liable to construction at the time, unless we fortify and 
make it very strong and clear. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1ST SESS. 2768 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wade).  The Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment shared this view but wished to eliminate any remaining doubt on the 
question.  See Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 289, 295-97 (2006).  For a review of 
the legislative history, see Garett Epps, The Citizenship Clause:  A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. 
L. REV. 331 (2010). 
 12. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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any such debate; the issue was settled by the Civil War.  No one today 
would seriously advance the position that the Constitution permits 
secession, at least the kind that the Confederacy attempted.  Where is 
the text that settled this question?  The answer, of course, is that this 
question, like other important constitutional questions, is decided by 
something other than the text.13 
It is true, of course, that the Civil War resolved the issue and 
crystallized a new conception of the nature of the Union.  It is wrong, 
however, to see the resolution as completely non-textual.  In fact, the 
Fourteenth Amendment enshrines the Civil War’s political 
transformation of the Union into Constitutional text. 
In part, the victory of nationalism was embodied in the Citizenship 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Seth Kreimer gives a cogent 
explanation of this point: 
At the time the United States was founded, one could conceive of 
American citizenship as derived from a more basic identification with 
each of the component states, but the time has long past when the 
“United States of America” was a plural construction. . . . As a 
political matter the Civil War resolved the issue by force of arms, and 
the resolution was embodied in the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment:  persons born or naturalized in the United 
States are indissolubly citizens of the United States, and only 
derivatively or contingently citizens of the “State wherein they 
reside.”14 
Similarly, a federal judge remarked in 1871 that “[b]y the original 
constitution citizenship in the United States was a consequence of 
 
 13. David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1153, 1155-56 (1998).  Strauss has made the same argument elsewhere: 
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, respected political and legal figures advanced 
serious legal arguments, claiming descent from Jefferson's Kentucky Resolutions, in 
support of the right to secede.  No amendment adopted after the Civil War settled this 
question, either expressly or by any reasonably direct implication. 
  Yet the question has, without doubt, been settled.  The person on the street would 
say that the Civil War settled it, and that person would be right.  The Civil War settled it, 
even though no formal amendment was added to the Constitution.   
David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1486 
(2001) (emphasis added).  Strauss is probably right that as a practical matter, the Civil War would 
have banished any serious claims about the right to secede even without a formal Amendment.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment can be seen as memorializing a constitutional shift that had already taken 
place, at least as much as it can be considered to be the cause of the shift.  But as a legal matter, the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the newly entrenched vision of the Constitution and gave it a 
textual home. 
 14. Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand; the Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 983 (2002). 
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citizenship in a state,” but that under the Fourteenth Amendment “this 
order of things is reversed.”15  Thus, the Citizenship Clause implies that 
a state has no right to sever the bond between a U.S. citizen and that 
national government through secession or otherwise. 
The Fourteenth Amendment does not, however, leave the issue of 
state power to implication.  Although the Citizenship Clause is part of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s resolution of the issue of secession, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause is equally important.  While the 
Citizenship Clause makes it clear that citizens owe their primary 
allegiance to the federal government, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause makes it clear that states have no power to interfere with the 
rights attaching to citizenship.  Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment 
then completes the picture, giving Congress the power to enforce the 
rights of citizenship against the states.  In short, the Fourteenth 
Amendment creates a duty on citizens of allegiance toward the United 
States, a prohibition on state interference with those rights, and a federal 
power of enforcement against the states. 
One reason why the Fourteenth Amendment’s invalidation of 
secession is important is that there has been something of a revival of 
interest in the topic in recent years.  Most notably, in April 2009, Texas 
Governor Rick Perry came close to threatening secession, reportedly 
suggesting that “Texans might at some point get so fed up they would 
want to secede from the union,” though he said “he sees no reason why 
Texas should do that.”16  He added: 
  There’s a lot of different scenarios. . . . We’ve got a great union. 
There’s absolutely no reason to dissolve it.  But if Washington 
continues to thumb their nose at the American people, you know, who 
knows what might come out of that.  But Texas is a very unique place, 
and we’re a pretty independent lot to boot.17 
At the other end of the political spectrum, Thomas Naylor, a retired 
economics professor, published a book in 2005 advocating that Vermont 
withdraw from the Union.18  Academic discussion of the secession issue 
 
 15. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15282). 
 16. Governor Says Texans May Want to Secede From Union But Probably Won’t, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/15/governor-says-texans-
want-secede-union-probably-wont/. 
 17. Id. 
 18. THOMAS H. NAYLOR, THE VERMONT MANIFESTO:  THE SECOND VERMONT REPUBLIC 
(2005); Robert C. Black, Book Note, If at First You Don’t Secede, Try, Try Again, 39 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 839, 842 (2005) (reviewing NAYLOR, supra).  See also Joseph Curl, Blue States Buzz Over 
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has also increased,19 as is indicated by this Symposium itself.  Although 
occasional uses of secessionist rhetoric should probably not be taken as 
serious advocacy for fragmenting the nation, they do highlight the need 
to clarify the nature of our constitutional order. 
To understand fully the relevance of the first two clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to secession, we need to examine the antebellum 
disputes about citizenship and sovereignty, the subject of Part II below.  
Issues about citizenship arose in the context of specific disputes about 
naturalization, expatriation, and the rights of freedmen, but they 
implicated conflicts over the seat of allegiance and the nature of the 
Union. 
Part III turns to the Reconstruction debates and shows how they 
reflect a fundamentally nationalistic view of citizenship.  The 
Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution were connected with a 
powerful vision of national citizenship and its implications for federal 
and state power.  Under this vision, the national government had the first 
claim to the loyalty of citizens and in return was obligated to protect 
their rights as American citizens against state interference.  An effort by 
a state to secede would directly imperil the status of its residents as 
American citizens, and both the federal government and the residents 
themselves had a duty to resist this interference with their constitutional 
rights.  The two clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment dealing most 
directly with citizenship embody this vision. 
II.  ANTEBELLUM CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND THE NATURE OF 
THE UNION 
It might seem obvious today that state law cannot control who is or 
is not a U.S. citizen.  But it was not always so clear, for reasons that 
were related to the ultimate crisis of the constitutional order during the 
Civil War.  Understanding the connection between citizenship and 
secession requires an examination of the conflicting theories of the 
 
Secession, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at A1 (describing blue state buzz over secession after 
George W. Bush’s successful re-election, some of it serious, some of it merely rhetorical). 
 19. See, e.g., Cynthia Nicoletti, The American Civil War as a Trial by Battle, 28 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 71 (2010) (arguing that the Civil War did not resolve the legal question of the secession’s 
constitutionality); Peter Radan, Lincoln, the Constitution and Secession, in SECESSION AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON:  FROM AMERICA’S CIVIL WAR TO CONTEMPORARY SEPARATIST 
MOVEMENTS 56-75 (Don H. Doyle ed., 2010) (critiquing Lincoln’s arguments against secession); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 
703-15 (2004) (endorsing Lincoln’s view of secession); Akhil Reed Amar, Abraham Lincoln and 
the American Union, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109 (2001) (critical discussion of Lincoln’s view). 
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Union that led to the secession crisis and their connection with 
antebellum conceptions of citizenship.  Part A will briefly describe 
antebellum constitutional theories, Part B investigates conceptions of 
citizenship, and Part C ties the two topics together. 
A. Secession and the Nature of the Union 
Today, the Supreme Court’s view of the nature of the Union holds 
that the Constitution transformed a loose association of states into a true 
national government that derived its power directly from the people.  
This view was expressed by the majority opinion in the Term Limits 
case, in which Justice Stevens’ majority opinion lays out the 
conventional modern view of state and federal sovereignty.20  Under the 
Articles of Confederation, according to Justice Stevens, “the States 
retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound 
together only by treaties.”21  The new Constitution “reject[ed] the notion 
that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creat[ed] a direct 
link between the National Government and the people of the United 
States.”22  Under this view, secession by a state would have been 
appropriate before the ratification of the Constitution as a form of treaty 
revocation, but after the Constitution the states became subordinate 
sovereigns who had no right to interfere with the relationship between 
the federal government and We the People.  
Before the Civil War, there were a variety of views on this issue.  
Abraham Lincoln was at the nationalist end of the spectrum, and his 
view went further than the Term Limits majority in affirming American 
nationhood.  In Lincoln’s view, the “Union is much older than the 
Constitution.”23  Instead of viewing the Articles of Confederation as a 
federation between independent state sovereigns, he argued that the 
Union actually pre-dated the formation of the states themselves.24  From 
this perspective, the Constitution was simply another step in the 
evolution of the nation’s government, merely being a revised framework 
to govern an already existing nation. 
In effect, Lincoln’s vision of nationalism made the Declaration of 
Independence, rather than the Constitution, the foundational national 
 
 20. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 21. Id. at 803. 
 22. Id. 
 23. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, First Inaugural Address, in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 265 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS]. 
 24. For a defense of Lincoln’s view, see Murray Dry, Born on the Fourth of July, LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 66. 
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document.  Thus, Lincoln displaced the Constitution from center stage, 
tying national identity much more closely to the Declaration as the initial 
collective statement of American nationhood.  This may or may not be 
good history, but it surely accords with conventional Fourth of July 
rhetoric, which ties the Declaration not merely to the independence of 
individual states from Britain but more importantly to the creation of the 
United States.  
Indeed, Lincoln insisted that that the Union was formed by the 
Articles of Association in 1774, even before it was “matured and 
continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776.”25  Because the 
states never had any independent existence, secession was legally 
impossible.  As Lincoln said, “[t]he States have their status IN the 
Union, and they have no other legal status.  If they break from this, they 
can only do so against law, and by revolution.”26   
Lincoln made this constitutional vision the centerpiece of his 
opposition to secession.  After the fall of Fort Sumter, Lincoln’s 
message to Congress traced the Union back to 1774 and then to the 
Declaration of Independence:  “Our States have neither more, nor less 
power, than that reserved to them, in the Union by the Constitution—no 
one of them ever having been a State out of the Union.  The original 
ones passed in the Union even before they cast off their British colonial 
dependence.”27 
Thus, according to Lincoln, in the Declaration of Independence,  
[T]he ‘United Colonies’ were declared to be ‘Free and Independent 
States’; but, even then, the object plainly was not to declare their 
independence of one another, or of the Union; but directly the 
contrary, as their mutual pledge, and their mutual action, before, at the 
time, and afterwards, abundantly show.28 
A few years after Independence, Lincoln said, the Union was 
strengthened by the Articles of Confederation, which were declared to 
be perpetual, and then by the Constitution, which sought a “more perfect 
union.”29  From this he deduced that secession was unconstitutional:  
“But if the destruction of the Union, by one, or by a part only, of the 
 
 25. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 265. 
 26. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Special Message to Congress, July 4, 1861, in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 23, at 434. 
 27. Id. at 433. 
 28. Id. 
 29. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 265. 
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States, be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the 
Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.”30   
If the Confederation was perpetual, and the Constitution created a 
more perfect union, then the Constitution had to provide for a perpetual 
bond.  Moreover, because the only true sovereign government was 
national, Lincoln’s view implied that citizenship was predominantly a 
national rather than state status; thus, allegiance was primarily owed to 
the federal government. 
Lincoln’s nationalist view contrasted sharply with the state-
centered constitutional theory held by many Southerners.  In defending 
the constitutionality of secession, Jefferson Davis affirmed a long-
standing Southern view of the nature of the Union.  During the 
American Revolution, Davis said, the British threat to American liberty 
had led to an alliance under which each state expressly retained its 
sovereignty.31  Davis’ narrative continued with a Constitutional 
Convention by state-appointed delegates who negotiated what he called 
“a compact between independent States.”32  State sovereignty, Davis 
said, was then explicitly reaffirmed in the Tenth Amendment.33  But a 
heresy arose in the North, according to Davis—a heresy holding that that 
Constitution did not create a compact of states but a national 
government. 34 
Note that Lincoln did not exactly endorse this “heresy”—instead, 
he viewed nationhood as pre-dating the Constitution.  So, by Davis’ 
standards, Lincoln’s view was even worse than the northern “heresy;” it 
was practically infidel.  It is little wonder that Lincoln failed to persuade 
Southerners of his views. 
The theory advanced by Davis was hardly original.  John Calhoun 
was perhaps the most articulate spokesman for the Southern theory of 
the Union.  He claimed that the states had separately become sovereign 
when they declared independence from England.35  This sovereignty 
remained intact through the Articles of Confederation, and in the 
Constitution, all the states had done was appoint the federal government 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Jefferson Davis, Message to Congress April 29, 1861 (Ratification of The Constitution), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_m042961.asp. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, 
in UNION AND LIBERTY:  THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 84 (Ross M. Lence 
ed., 1992). 
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as their agent to perform certain functions.36  According to Calhoun, the 
“government is a federal, in contradistinction to a national 
government—a government formed by the States; ordained and 
established by the States, and for the States—without any participation 
or agency whatever, on the part of the people, regarded in the aggregate 
as forming a nation.”37  (Notice the language “By the states . . . and for 
the states,” and contrast that language with Lincoln at Gettysburg.)  
There is, Calhoun said, “no such community, politically speaking, as the 
people of the United States, regarded in the light of, and as constituting 
one people or nation.”38  In short, he said, the Constitution created “the 
government of a community of States, and not the government of a 
single State or nation.”39  In a community of states, clearly the allegiance 
of citizens runs directly to their own state and only derivatively to the 
community as a whole.   
Calhoun and Davis were important historical figures, but they did 
not evolve their theories on their own.  Both drew on a larger tradition of 
Southern constitutionalism going back to Thomas Jefferson.  Well 
before Calhoun, the Southern vision of the Union had begun to emerge 
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.40  The Kentucky Resolutions, 
based on a draft of Jefferson’s, began with a strong affirmation of the 
compact theory.  The states created the general government for special 
purposes, reserving to each state all remaining power.  The Resolutions 
maintained that the federal government, as a creature of the compact, 
was not final judge of the extent of its own powers.  Instead, each party 
to the contract had to judge for itself whether the terms of the agreement 
had been violated.41  The Resolutions did not speak of secession, but the 
logical implication was that a party to the compact could withdraw in 
case of a breach or repudiation of the agreement by other parties. 
Thus, by the onset of the Civil War, the South already had an anti-
nationalist, state-centered theory of the Constitution for over half a 
century.  Indeed, according to a recent history of secession, the states’ 
 
 36. Id. at 83-84. 
 37. Id. at 116. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 82. 
 40. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM:  THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1788-1800, at 719 (1993). 
 41. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS 540, 544 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891).  On the difference between Jefferson and 
Madison regarding the precise nature of the federal compact, see H. Jefferson Powell, The 
Principles of ’98:  An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 717-18 (1994). 
10
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rights theory had become so familiar to Southerners by 1860 as to be 
boring: 
Secessionists’ potentially saving state’s rights creed started as a 
legalistic bore.  The 1860 secessionists (and their fathers and 
grandfathers) had grown up listening to endless disquisitions on how 
the states came before the nation, on how the states had ratified the 
U.S. Constitution, on how the ratifying bodies retained reserved rights 
and especially the right to withdraw their ratification, and how the 
original parties to a contract can rescind the document if its terms were 
violated.42 
So familiar was this theory that Southerners were outraged “when 
federal agents coercively violated the (white) people of a state’s 
sovereign right to shift consent to another government.”43  This theory 
became invaluable in bringing the Upper South to secede after Fort 
Sumter.  States like Virginia had not found Lincoln’s election a 
sufficient basis to secede, but “[i]f the federal agency coerced the people 
of a single state who had claimed their state’s right to remove their 
consent and never to be enslaved, the state’s rights justification could 
bring other southern states charging to the rescue, whatever they thought 
of the expediency of the first secession.”44 
Even today, remnants of the antebellum Southern constitutional 
vision occasionally surface.  Speaking for four members of the Court 
fifteen years ago, Justice Thomas invoked a similar conception of 
federalism.  In his Term Limits dissent, he said that the “ultimate source 
of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each 
individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the 
Nation as a whole”—adding that “the people of the several States are the 
only true source of power.”45  He seemed to indicate state sovereignty 
remains primary today:  “the people of each State retained their separate 
political identities,”46 and the “very name ‘congress’ suggests a coming 
together of representatives from distinct entities.”47   
Thus, although so far as we know no current Justice endorses a 
right to secede, elements of the antebellum Southern view linger in some 
present-day quarters.  One implication of this article is that the 
 
 42. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT, 1854-1861, 
at 346 (2007). 
 43. Id. at 349. 
 44. Id. at 351. 
 45. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846-47 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 849. 
 47. Id. at 857-58.  
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Fourteenth Amendment completed the work of the Constitution itself in 
consolidating the original colonies into a true nation.  Thus, the Term 
Limits dissenters were embracing a theory that lost whatever validity it 
ever had by 1867. 
B. Federalism and Citizenship in the Antebellum Period 
Justice Thomas oversimplified the issue in his Term Limits dissent, 
but the historical record does reflect considerable uncertainty and 
dispute about whether the United States was truly a nation.  The question 
of “whether the Revolution had created one community of allegiance or 
many” remained unresolved.48  
As an important part of this larger confusion, the relationship 
between states and national citizenship was unclear before the Civil 
War.  Just three weeks after the Declaration of Independence, the 
Continental Congress passed a resolution providing that “all persons 
residing within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from 
the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members 
of such colony.”49  The states quickly adopted their own naturalization 
laws,50 but their power over citizenship was the source of confusion.  
One reason for the confusion was that citizenship in a single state 
had significance in other states.  Each state’s citizens became entitled to 
equal treatment in all other states under the Articles of Confederation’s 
precursor to what is now the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV.51  As Kettner says, “[a]lthough the primary locus of allegiance 
throughout the Confederation period was still in the individual sovereign 
state, the idea that citizens belonged to a larger national community 
surfaced frequently, never fully articulated or theoretically explored, but 
persuasive—almost instinctive—in certain contexts.”52  For instance, it 
was unclear whether a person who had been naturalized by a state under 
the Articles was thereby a citizen of the United States for purposes of 
qualifying to sit in the United States Senate.53 
Before the Civil War, the dispute over sovereignty was tied to a 
dispute over the meaning of citizenship.  During the nullification crisis, 
 
 48. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 209. 
 49. Id. at 179. 
 50. Id. at 214-19. 
 51. Id. at 220. 
 52. Id. at 224. 
 53. Id. at 234-35.  For an overview of immigration policy prior to the Constitution, see James 
E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic:  
Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 371-85 (2010). 
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South Carolina insisted that the:  “[A]llegiance of the citizens . . . is due 
to the . . . State, and  . . . obedience only, and not allegiance, is due . . . to 
any other power or authority, to whom a control over them has been or 
may be delegated by the state.”54  The state legislature then passed a law 
requiring all militia officers to swear that they had “faithful and true 
allegiance” to the state.55  The law was held unconstitutional by the state 
appellate court, with a dissenting nullifier arguing that only the state 
government could command a citizen’s ultimate allegiance.56   
Southerners also argued that a national statute governing 
expatriation (abandonment of citizenship) would be unconstitutional, 
because it was not within any express Congressional power, leaving the 
matter to the states.57  As a U.S. Representative from Virginia put it, 
“[t]he relation to the State government was the basis of the relation to 
the General Government, and therefore, as long as man continues a 
citizen of a State, he must be considered a citizen of the United States.”58 
On the eve of Civil War, the dominant Southern view was that 
allegiance to state government was primary.  However, adherence to the 
primacy of state citizenship was not absolute.  In the name of protecting 
the power of Southern states to exclude free blacks from other states, 
Southerners were also willing to limit the power of other states to make 
blacks citizens for purposes of federal law.  Allowing Northern states to 
make blacks into citizens would have led to the unpalatable conclusion 
that their status as citizens in Northern states would have been entitled to 
recognition in Southern states under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott contended that the 
Framers considered blacks “a subordinate and inferior class of beings, 
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
 
 54. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 265. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 267. 
 57. Id. at 282-83.  Justice Paterson had taken a contrary view in the lead opinion in Talbot v. 
Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795): 
The act of the legislature of Virginia, does not apply.  Ballard was a citizen of Virginia, 
and also of the United States.  If the legislature of Virginia pass an act specifying the 
causes of expatriation, and prescribing the manner in which it is to be effected by the 
citizens of that state, what can be its operation on the citizens of the United States?  If the 
act of Virginia affects Ballard’s citizenship, so far as respects that state, can it touch his 
citizenship so far as it regards the United States?  Allegiance to a particular state, is one 
thing; allegiance to the United States is another.  Will it be said, that the renunciation of 
allegiance to the former implies or draws after it a renunciation of allegiance to the 
latter?  The sovereignties are different; the allegiance is different; the right too, may be 
different. 
Id. at 153-54.  For background on the case, see BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 116-22. 
 58. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 283. 
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emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no 
rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the 
Government might choose to grant them.”59  Justice Daniels managed to 
exceed even Taney’s level of offensiveness with his dictum:  “That in 
the establishment of the several communities now the States of this 
Union, and in the formation of the Federal Government, the African was 
not deemed politically a person.”60  Note, however, that the Constitution 
refers to slaves as “persons held to servitude,”61 as Justice McLean 
pointed out in his dissent.62  It is also significant that citizenship had 
never been completely limited to whites:  Indians were eligible for 
citizenship, and some southern courts held that free blacks automatically 
became state citizens.63   
James Madison himself took the view that emancipated blacks were 
entitled to the right of citizenship.64  Moreover, an 1803 federal statute 
banned ships from bringing any black into the country who were not “a 
native, a citizen, or registered seaman of the United States.”65  That 
statute clearly implies that a black could be a citizen of the United 
States, and in 1807, Americans had been outraged by British seizure of 
four “American citizens,” two of whom were black.66 
 
 59. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856).  DON EDWARD FEHRENBACHER, THE 
DRED SCOTT CASE:  ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978), is a classic 
treatment of the historical context, legal complexities, decisional process, and impact of the case.  It 
is more readily available in an abridged paperback, DON EDWARD FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, 
& POLITICS:  THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981).  Another useful 
treatment is PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD:  A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 
(1997), which also contains excerpts from the long, meandering opinions and reprints the responses 
of Northern and Southern papers to the decision.  For a brief introduction to the case and its effects, 
see RICHARD H. SEWELL, A HOUSE DIVIDED:  SECTIONALISM AND CIVIL WAR, 1848-1865, at 57-61 
(1988).  
 60. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 481. 
 61. The fugitive slave clause provides: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from 
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service of Labour may be due. 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.  The point is that, while slaves may have been property, they were 
also persons for some constitutional purposes.  Whether status as property could be squared with the 
right to due process created by the Fifth Amendment is a question that may have had no satisfactory 
resolution before the issue was rendered moot by the Civil War. 
 62. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 537 (Mclean, J., dissenting). 
 63. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 316-19. 
 64. BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 259. 
 65. Dred Scott, 60. U.S. at 587 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 66. BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 235-36. 
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss2/6
12- FARBER_MACRO.DOCM 6/13/2012  3:42 PM 
2012] THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 493 
In dissent, Justice McLean pointed out that Taney’s historical 
exegesis was remarkably one-sided:  “[W]hile I admit the government 
was not made expecially [sic] for the colored race, yet many of them 
were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the rights of 
suffrage when the Constitution was adopted.”67  In Massachusetts, for 
example, a proposed 1778 state constitution went down to defeat in part 
because it excluded blacks from the right to vote.68  This may not prove 
that free blacks were regarded as U.S. citizens, but it does rebut Taney’s 
assertion that blacks were incapable of being members of the political 
community or of having legal rights that others were required to 
accept.69 
One reason for the relative paucity of evidence about the Framers’ 
definition of citizenship is that they were rarely required to consider it.  
Citizenship is an important legal concept, but not necessarily decisive in 
a broad range of contexts.  In many respects, personhood is the more 
important concept under the U.S. Constitution.  In the Constitution itself, 
citizenship is mostly mentioned as a job qualification for elected federal 
office.70  But there is no constitutional requirement of citizenship for 
appointed office as a member of the judiciary or the Cabinet; nor any 
limitation of the franchise to citizens.   
Moreover, the Constitution allowed free blacks to participate in the 
selection of members of Congress, provided that the state allowed them 
to vote or hold office.  Article I, section 2, provides that voters for House 
members “have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislature,” so blacks could vote in 
federal elections if they could vote in state elections, regardless of 
 
 67. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 537. 
 68. BRADBURN, supra note 7, at 245.  Bradburn believes that free blacks were close to 
treatment as citizens at the time of the Revolution but then were gradually demoted to the status of 
“denizens” in the early Nineteenth Century.  Id. at 239-40. 
 69. The Dred Scott case continues to attract interest today, as seen by recent scholarship such 
as Gerald Leonard, Law and Politics Reconsidered:  A New Constitutional History of Dred Scott, 34 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 747 (2009); Harry V. Jaffa, Dred Scott Revisited, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 197 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49 (2007); Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, 
and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393 (2007); Sam Erman, An “Unintended 
Consequence”:  Dred Scott Reinterpreted, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (2008). 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (members of the House must have been citizens of the 
United States for seven years); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must have been citizens of the 
United States for nine years and citizens of the state at the time of election); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 5 (the President must be “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of 
the Adoption of this Constitution”).  Note that the requirements for Senators clearly distinguish 
between United States citizenship and citizenship in a particular state. 
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whether they were citizens.71  Under Article I, section 3, members of the 
Senate are chosen by state legislatures, with no stated restriction on who 
can serve in such a legislature. 72 
Apart from the qualifications for political office, there were only a 
few provisions directly bearing on citizenship.  Article I, section 8, 
clause 4, gives Congress the power to “establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization . . . throughout the United States.”73  Otherwise, 
citizenship shows up only in Article III’s definition of diversity 
jurisdiction74 and in Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.75  
Only in these two clauses and in the requirements for election to the 
Senate is state citizenship rather than federal citizenship mentioned.  
And notwithstanding Taney’s effort to restrict Article III diversity 
jurisdiction to whites, there was no constitutional barrier to blacks 
bringing suit under Article III’s admiralty or federal question jurisdiction 
because the Constitution does not tie these to the identity of the parties. 
Citizenship seemed to have less relevance to possession of rights 
than mere legal personhood.  Article III, section 2, clause 3 provides a 
right to a jury in the “Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of 
Impeachment,” without reference to citizenship.76  Article I, section 9 
prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws without any reference 
to the citizenship of the defendant.77  Some provisions of the Bill of 
Rights refer to “the people,” which by Taney’s reasoning might not have 
included blacks.78  But the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, governing due 
process, property confiscation, and criminal procedure, are not so 
limited, nor is the right to jury trial in civil cases of the Seventh 
Amendment. 
 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 74. Article III provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of 
another State; —between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subject. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 75. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV states that the “Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 1. 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 78. For instance, the Fourth Amendment provides that the “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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C. Citizenship, Sovereignty, and Secession 
More vexing before the Civil War than the legal dimension of U.S. 
citizenship was its significance in terms of political obligation.  Was 
Robert E. Lee an American citizen who owed allegiance to the United 
States first and foremost?  If so, he was guilty of treason in taking up 
arms against the U.S. government and giving aid and comfort to its 
enemies.79  Or was he a citizen of Virginia first and foremost, in which 
case he was bravely defending his country (Virginia) against a foreign 
enemy? 
These citizenship issues had an obvious link with visions of the 
Union.  The constitutionality of secession turned on whether the United 
States was a confederation of states (so that being an American citizen 
derived from being a state citizen), or whether the United States was a 
genuine nation (so that American citizenship was primary).  Even today, 
these viewpoints have left remnants in historical terminology.  The 
former view is implicit in references to the Civil War as “the war 
between the states,” whereas under the latter view it was a Civil War 
between the United States and Southern rebels. 
Before the Civil War, the answer to this question was debatable, but 
the Constitution itself was more nationalist than many people then or 
now seem to realize.  To begin with, there is the Preamble’s intention to 
create “a more perfect Union”80 than the Articles of Confederation, 
which itself was supposed to be perpetual.81  Other provisions of the 
Constitution, however, also speak volumes about the desire to create a 
powerful national government, not just an agent for a confederation of 
independent sovereigns.  Besides granting the federal government broad 
powers over the economy including control of all interstate commerce, 
 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 provides that “[t]reason against the United States, shall 
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort.” 
 80. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 81. As the Supreme Court said in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1968): 
  The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation.  It began 
among the Colonies, and grew out of common origin, mutual sympathies, kindred 
principles, similar interests, and geographical relations.  It was confirmed and 
strengthened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and 
sanction from the Articles of Confederation.  By these the Union was solemnly declared 
to “be perpetual.”  And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the 
exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained “to form a more perfect Union.”  
It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words.  
What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not? 
Id. at 724-25.  In dissent, Justice Grier refused to opine on the constitutionality of secession and said 
that the issue had been settled through “trial by battle.”  Id. at 740. 
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exclusive power to coin money, and the bankruptcy power,82 the 
Constitution invested the powers of war and peace, and the power to 
make treaties, in the United States.  It explicitly denied those powers to 
the states.83  It also allowed the federal government to intervene in the 
internal political affairs of a state if it considers the state’s form of 
government not to be “Republican” in nature.84  
In addition, federal laws are “the Supreme Law of the Land” and 
override state constitutions, meaning that the people of the states gave up 
their plenary power to draft constitutions to suit themselves.85  The 
federal government also controls naturalization and hence limits the 
power of a state to determine who counts as a citizen.  All of these 
provisions seem well beyond the terms of a mere confederation.  The 
states did retain control of purely local affairs, but that role seems 
decidedly subordinate to the sweeping constitutional powers of the 
federal government to address issues of national and international 
importance. 
To see the degree to which the Constitution created something 
more than a mere confederation, it may be helpful to consider a modern-
day analogy.  Imagine a proposal to give “the United States of All the 
Americas (USAA)” the power to replace the U.S. dollar with a new 
currency, while disbanding the U.S. Army in favor of a military 
controlled by a president elected by North and South Americans.  The 
USAA also controls all international trade in the Americas and takes 
over control of immigration issues.  On top of this, the laws of the 
USAA override the U.S. Constitution.  It is hard to imagine that anyone 
would think this organization was just a federation of existing states like 
NATO or that the USAA was merely acting as an agent for individual 
governments like the IMF or World Bank today. 
Even more than the extensive national powers given to the U.S. 
government, the title of the document speaks strongly of nationhood.  Its 
predecessor was called the Articles of Confederation.  Eschewing this 
term, the new title is “Constitution of the United States.”  According to 
the Preamble, this national constitution is “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] . 
. . for the United States of America” by “We the People of the United 
 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (commerce power); cl. 4 (bankruptcy); cl. 5 (control of the 
money supply).   Other economic powers include control of intellectual property rights, art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8; the taxing and spending powers, cl. 1; and control of weights and measures, cl. 5. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3. 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
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States” in order “to form a more perfect Union.”86  This language sounds 
very much like the creation of a nation—as the union of Scotland and 
England created the United Kingdom.87 
Notably, the Constitutional Convention sent the Continental 
Congress a letter explaining its efforts.88  The letter spoke of the need to 
place key powers “fully and effectually” in the federal government, 
which admittedly would require some sacrifice of state sovereignty.89  
Moreover, the letter says:  “In all our deliberations on this subject we 
kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of 
every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is 
involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national 
existence.”90  The references to “consolidation” and to “our national 
existence” are inconsistent with the notion of a confederation.  The letter 
closes with the hope that the Constitution “may promote the lasting 
welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and 
happiness”—rather than the “welfare of the countries dear to each of 
us.”91  This is nationalist language, not the language of a compact 
between independent sovereigns. 
Still, the case of American nationhood (and with it, the case against 
secession) cannot be considered ironclad before the Civil War.  As 
Madison pointed out in Federalist 39, the structure of the government 
contained ambiguities.92  Madison pointed to nationalist features of the 
Constitution such as the operation and extent of federal powers.93  Yet 
the governance structure relied heavily on the states as separate entities 
(such as the election of Senators by state legislatures), and the 
ratification process was by state conventions rather than a national vote.   
 
 86. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 87. On the resemblance between the formation of the U.K. and the Constitution, see Akhil 
Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 683 (2002) (“The phrase ‘perfect Union’ in fact echoes 
language from the Union of England and Scotland in 1707, as Publius reminds his readers in The 
Federalist No. 5”). 
 88. The text of the letter can be found in Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten 
Cover Letter:  An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
615, 649-50 (1995). 
 89. Id. at 649. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 650. 
 92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888). 
 93. Id. 
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III.  CITIZENSHIP, RECONSTRUCTION, AND PROTECTION AGAINST STATE 
ACTION 
In short, although the Constitution bears strong marks of nation 
building, there was no smoking-gun proof of the nature of the Union in 
the constitutional text that could decisively prevent Southerners from 
adopting a states-rights vision.  As Part III will explain, that smoking 
gun was supplied by the Fourteenth Amendment.  What was arguably 
still an open question in 1860 was answered in no uncertain terms in 
1866 with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment are familiar 
but their significance is obscure today because we have lost the 
historical context that made issues of U.S. citizenship so foundational to 
the constitutional regime.  The first sentence of the amendment provides 
that “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”94  Only with the passage of this amendment did it 
become incontestable that state citizenship was merely a geographic by-
product of federal citizenship.  Correspondingly, the second sentence of 
the amendment prohibits states from interfering with the privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship.95  The upshot of these sections is the 
United States involves a direct relationship between the federal 
government and citizens that is beyond any form of interference by the 
states, which enjoy only a secondary right to allegiance from their 
residents.  While the two clauses may seem to deal only with some 
narrowly-defined legal issues relating to citizenship, the implications 
were much broader. 
Part III discusses the implications of this change for the issue of 
secession.  The right to secede is a natural feature of a confederation 
where citizens owe allegiance to their own individual local governments, 
but out of place in a nation that demands the primary allegiance of its 
citizens and in turn promises to protect their rights from interference by 
local governments. 
We will begin in Part A by examining the reciprocal relationship 
between a citizen’s allegiance to the sovereign and the right to protection 
by the sovereign.  Part B shows how these ideas entered the 
Reconstruction view of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
Then, Part C shows how concepts of allegiance and protection were put 
to use in the Reconstruction debates to support the right of American 
 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 95. Id. 
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citizens to national protection against infringement by their own state 
governments.  Finally, Part D shows how the Supreme Court viewed the 
relationship between citizenship and rights after the Civil War.  
Although the Court took a narrow view of what rights inhered in 
national citizenship, it clearly understood that national citizenship was 
primary and beyond the reach of state authority. 
A. Protection and Allegiance 
According to legal historian Philip Hamburger, “[t]he reciprocal 
relation of allegiance and protection . . . became a foundation of 
American government.”96  As we will see, this concept was deeply 
embedded in the common law and in the thinking of the Republicans 
who passed the Fourteenth Amendment.  It implied that, if residents of 
seceding states remained U.S. citizens, they were entitled to the 
protection of the U.S. government against would-be secessionists and to 
enforcement of their rights under federal law. 
The connections between citizenship, allegiance, and government 
protection went back in English law at least to the time of Lord Coke, 
who was faced with such issues in the context of determining the rights 
of citizens of Scotland under English law during the reign of James I.97  
James had become King of both England and Scotland, but the countries 
had separate parliaments, so it was not clear how their citizenships 
related.98  Fundamental to Coke’s analysis was the proposition that the 
“bond between the subject and the sovereign . . . involved reciprocal 
obligations” of allegiance and protection that attached at birth.99  The 
duty of allegiance to the King and the correlative rights to “the King’s 
legal protection” were explicit in the case.100  Because Scots born after 
the Union received the protection of James, who was monarch of both 
Scotland and England, they acquired a duty of allegiance to both states 
and hence citizenship in both parts of the realm. 
In the American Civil War, both sides claimed entitlement to 
allegiance, in each case implying that violations of allegiance would 
constitute treason.  Based on the theory that individual allegiance flowed 
 
 96. Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1853 (2009). 
 97. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
 98. Id. at 16. 
 99. Id. at 18. 
 100. See Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 88-89 (1997).  Francis Bacon’s argument for the plaintiff insisted that 
allegiance was due under the law of nature.  Id. at 109-10.  Coke accepted this theory.  Id. at 113, 
115. 
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fundamentally to the states, the Confederacy maintained that no change 
in allegiance took place at secession.  Thus, unlike the American 
Revolution, where individuals were considered to have a period in which 
to choose allegiance, the allegiance of Southerners automatically 
remained with the existing states when those state governments chose to 
sever their relationship with the federal government.101  Hence, after 
secession, Southern Unionists were subject to the law of treason.  A 
similar situation would arise today if the United States decided to leave 
the United Nations or NATO.  Such a decision would clearly have no 
effect on the status of U.S. citizens who would remain citizens of the 
United States, not citizens of NATO, and Americans who chose to side 
with NATO against the United States in a military conflict would be 
guilty of treason.  For the same reason, according to Confederate legal 
theory, Southerners who decided to side with the North after secession 
were guilty of treason.102 
As might be expected, Northerners took a different view.  The 
significance attached to national citizenship and allegiance in the North 
became evident in the early days of the war.  In the Prize Cases,103 for 
example, the Supreme Court was required to determine not only the 
president’s power to impose a blockade, but also the relationship of 
Southerners to the federal government after the outbreak of the war.104  
The Court strongly affirmed presidential power to react to the 
emergency without waiting for congressional approval or a declaration 
of war.  When war broke out, the Court said, “[t]he President was bound 
to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to 
baptize it with a name;  and no name given to it by him or them could 
change the fact.”105  As to the question of the status of the citizens in the 
South, the Court said, “[t]hey have cast off their allegiance and made 
war on their Government, and are none the less enemies because they 
 
 101. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 335. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
 104. Id. at 640-41.  In attempting to uphold the blockade, the federal government was put in a 
difficult position.  On the one hand, it was committed to the position that secession was legally void 
and that Southerners remained citizens of the United States subject to American municipal law.  The 
implication of this view was that the Civil War was in effect a police action against a band of 
criminals.  But such a police action would not give the United States the right under the law of 
nations to impose a blockade on neutrals on the high seas, nor would it give the Government the 
right under the Constitution to seize the property of citizens who were not proved to be members of 
the criminal group.  Those remedies were available only against enemy aliens.  Republicans 
uneasily straddled these conflicting theories. 
 105. Id. at 669. 
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are traitors.”106  In an affirmation of nationalism, the Court also said that 
citizens owe “supreme allegiance” to the federal government but only 
“qualified allegiance” to their states.107  Note that this holding anticipates 
the view ultimately enshrined in the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
B. Citizenship and Rights 
Given the emotional significance of allegiance during the sectional 
conflict and the expansion of national power under the stress of war, it is 
not remarkable that Republicans used the concept of national citizenship 
to justify their support for the Civil Rights bill.  Republicans invoked the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section 2, of the original 
Constitution.  As we will see, they believed that the clause had already 
established the connection between United States citizenship and 
fundamental rights.   
Congressional Republicans had their own theory of citizenship, 
based in part on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.  
Section 2 of Article IV provides that “[t]he citizens of each State shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several 
States.”108  This language is somewhat unclear.  One reading is that “in 
the several states” tells us both where the rights are protected and which 
rights exist (those created severally—that is separately—in particular 
states).  On this reading, the clause prohibits states from discriminating 
against citizens of other states.  But the other reading is that the 
“privileges and immunities of citizens” are national in scope rather than 
being defined by particular state.  Every law student today learns the 
antidiscrimination meaning of the clause, which may well be the correct 
interpretation.  But Republicans, as we will see, often favored the 
national rights interpretation. 
The Republican interpretation of this clause relied heavily on 
Corfield v. Coryell.109  In Corfield, Justice Bushrod Washington said that 
 
 106. Id. at 674. 
 107. “Under the very peculiar Constitution of this Government, although the citizens owe 
supreme allegiance to the Federal Government, they owe also a qualified allegiance to the State in 
which they are domiciled.”  Id. at 673. 
 108. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 109. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).  See also Douglas v. 
Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465, 469-74, 476-77 (1821).  Corfield has some resemblance to the Supreme 
Court’s current view of the Comity Clause, which also uses a fundamental rights analysis, although 
the modern Court uses the idea of fundamental rights as a limitation on the anti-discrimination 
prohibition rather than viewing it as the core of the clause’s meaning.  For a critique of Corfield and 
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the Comity Clause protected “those privileges and immunities which are, 
in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several states.”110  Among these rights were “[p]rotection 
by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety;  subject nevertheless to such restraints as the 
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”111 
This interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause figured 
prominently in the debates on the 1866 Civil Rights bill.  One purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act, 
so the debates on that statute are particularly relevant to understanding 
the amendment. 
In the Senate debate on the 1866 act, Senator Lyman Trumbull 
referred to the Privileges and Immunities Clause to support the 
constitutionality of federal civil rights legislation at a time when the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not yet exist.  He argued that:   
The rights of a citizen of the United States were certain great 
fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail 
one’s self of all the laws passed for the benefit of the citizen to enable 
him to enforce his rights;  inasmuch as this was the definition given to 
the term as applied in that part of the Constitution, I reasoned from 
that, that when the Constitution had been amended and slavery 
abolished, and we were about to pass a law declaring every person, no 
matter of what color, born in the United States a citizen of the United 
States, the same rights would then appertain to all persons who were 
clothed with American citizenship.112 
In the House, Representative Henry Wilson argued that the rights 
protected in the bill were not new because they were already contained 
in the Comity Clause as construed in Corfield.  In his view, that clause 
represented a “general citizenship” which “entitles every citizen to 
 
its use as a limitation on the clause, see Stewart Jay, Origins of the Privileges and Immunities of 
State Citizenship under Article IV, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=185377.  
 110. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.  
 111. Id.  For a more in-depth discussion of the case, see David R. Upham, Note, Corfield v. 
Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1483 (2005). 
 112. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 600 (1866).  See also id. at 476 (bill protects 
“fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man”).  Trumbull used somewhat similar 
language in connection with the Freedmen’s Bureau bill.  See id. at 319, 322. 
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security and protection of personal rights.”113  He argued that the bill 
protected rights belonging to “citizens of the United States, as such.”114   
Representative Lawrence discussed the role of the Comity Clause 
in great detail in his response to the President’s veto of the bill.  He 
stated:   
I maintain that Congress may by law secure the citizens of the nation 
in the enjoyment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and property, 
and the means essential to that end, . . . to enforce the observance of 
the provisions of [the Comity Clause], and the equal civil rights which 
it recognizes or by implication affirms to exist among citizens of the 
same State.115   
Lawrence concluded, after a discussion of some of the cases and 
writings dealing with the Comity Clause, that it embodies “equal 
fundamental civil rights for all citizens.”116 
Thus, even before the Fourteenth Amendment, members of the 
Reconstruction saw Congress as having the power to protect the rights of 
citizens from violation by state government.  They rooted this 
understanding in a clause protecting the “privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states.”  When it came time to ensure that their 
constitutional views were entrenched in the constitutional text, they 
chose similar but more explicit language relating to the “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
C. Protecting the Rights of Citizens Against the States 
Another concept played an important role in the debates over the 
Civil Rights Act:  the idea that citizens owe allegiance to their 
government in exchange for the government’s grant of protection to 
them.  Thus, one of the most important rights of citizenship is the right 
to receive such protection.  This concept served not only as a possible 
source of rights, but also as a source of power to protect the rights of 
citizens that might arise from other sources such as the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 
 
 113. Id. at 1118. 
 114. Id. at 1294. 
 115. Id. at 1835. 
 116. Id. at 1836.  See also id. at 1263 (remarks by Rep. Broomall listing free speech as one of 
the “rights and immunities of citizens”); id. at 1266 (remarks of Rep. Raymond listing “right to bear 
arms”  as a right of citizens); id. at 1293-94 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger, right of petition is an 
“indispensable” right of citizenship). 
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Early in the debates on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Reverdy 
Johnson raised the argument that the federal government had a duty to 
protect its citizens from state interference with their rights: 
If I am right . . . that we can authorize them [blacks] to sue, authorize 
them to contract, authorize them to do everything short of voting, it is 
not because there is anything in the Constitution of the United States 
that confers the authority to give to a negro the right to contract, but it 
is because it is a necessary, incidental function of a Government that it 
should have authority to provide that the rights of everybody within its 
limits shall be protected, and protected alike.117 
Senator Johnson concluded that it “would have been a disgrace to the 
members of the [Constitutional] Convention” if they had foreseen the 
abolition of slavery and “had denied to the Congress of the United States 
the authority to pass laws for the protection of all the rights incident to 
the condition of a free man.”118  His argument was echoed by Senator 
Morrill.119 
A similar argument was made in the House by Representative 
Broomall.  He made a sweeping, non-textual argument: 
But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are 
characteristics of Governments that belong to them as such, without 
which they would cease to be Governments.  The rights and duties of 
allegiance and protection are corresponding rights and duties. . . .  
[Wherever] I owe allegiance to my country, there it owes me 
protection, and wherever my Government owes me no protection I owe 
it no allegiance and can commit no treason.120 
Broomall attacked the idea that such protection could be left to the 
states, inasmuch as “everybody knows that the rights and immunities of 
citizens were habitually and systematically denied in certain States to the 
citizens of other States:  the right of speech, the right of transit, the right 
of domicil [sic], the right to sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the right 
of petition.”121  Broomall also argued that the necessity for the bill was 
not limited to blacks because loyal whites were being denied their basic 
rights in the South.122 
 
 117. Id. at 530.  See also Johnson’s expostulation in response to a contrary argument by Sen. 
Henderson.  Id. at 572. 
 118. Id. at 530. 
 119. Id. at 570 (remarks of Sen. Morrill). 
 120. Id. at 1263. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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Representative Wilson made one of the most forceful arguments 
based on the duty to protect.  He argued that the bill did not establish 
new rights, but instead protected and enforced those which already 
belonged to every citizen.  In his opinion, the Comity Clause entitled 
every citizen to protection of personal rights.  He summarized his 
defense of congressional power as follows: 
If a citizen of the United States should go abroad, and while within the 
jurisdiction of a foreign Power be despoiled of his rights of personal 
security, personal liberty, or personal property contrary to the due 
course of law of the nation inflicting the wrong, this Government 
would espouse his cause and enforce redress even to the extremity of 
war.123 
From the power to protect U.S. citizens from foreign powers by war, 
Wilson deduced as a lesser-included case the power to protect citizens 
from their own state governments by peaceful means: 
[I]f all the terrible powers of war may be resorted to for the protection 
of the rights of our citizens when those rights are disregarded and 
trampled on beyond our jurisdiction, is it possible that our Constitution 
is so defective that we have no power under it to protect our citizens 
within our own jurisdiction through the peaceful means of statutes and 
courts?124 
Thus, Wilson concluded, the federal government had the inherent power 
to prevent states from violating the rights of U.S. citizens: 
I assert that we possess the power to do those things which 
Governments are organized to do; that we may protect a citizen of the 
United States against a violation of his rights by the law of a single 
State; . . . that this power permeates our whole system, is a part of it, 
without which the States can run riot over every fundamental right 
belonging to citizens of the United States; that the right to exercise this 
power depends upon no express delegation, but runs with the rights it 
is designed to protect.125 
Likewise, Representative Shellabarger stressed that because 
citizens owe their primary allegiance to the federal government, the 
government’s primary duty correspondingly was to protect them.  Like 
Wilson, Shellabarger argued that if the states could abridge those rights 
which the United States is bound to protect, even by a declaration of war 
 
 123. Id. at 1119.  Wilson reiterated essentially the same argument.  Id. at App. 157, 1294. 
 124. Id. at 1119. 
 125. Id.  A similar view was articulated by Representative Shellabarger.  Id. at 1293. 
27
Farber: The Fourteenth Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
12- FARBER_MACRO.DOCM 6/13/2012  3:42 PM 
506 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:479 
in the case of violations by foreign governments, then “the United States 
is no nation.”126   
After President Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights Bill, 
Senator Trumbull made an important speech in the Senate defending the 
bill against Johnson’s charges.  He asserted: 
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; . . . 
They are those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free 
citizens or free men in all countries, such as the rights enumerated in 
this bill, and they belong to them in all the States of the Union.127   
In short, he said, “the right of American citizenship means 
something.”128  That is a truism today, but would have been contested by 
Southerners before the war, who viewed American citizenship as 
nothing but a proxy for citizenship in Virginia or some other state. 
Trumbull stated that citizens are entitled to protection within the 
states as well as abroad.  He asserted that “American citizenship would 
be little worth” if it did not carry protection with it: 
  How is it that every person born in these United States owes 
allegiance to the Government?  Everything that he is or has, his 
property and his life, may be taken by the Government of the United 
States in its defense . . . and can it be that . . . we have got a 
Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of the 
citizen, but has no power to afford him protection?  Is that all that this 
boasted American citizenship amounts to? . . . Sir, it cannot be.129 
Trumbull staunchly rejected this limited view of the nature of 
citizenship: 
Such is not the meaning of our Constitution.  Such is not the meaning 
of American citizenship.  This Government, which would go to war to 
protect its meanest—I will not say citizen—inhabitant . . . in any 
foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon, has certainly 
some power to protect its own citizens in their own country.  
Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.130 
The right to protection was embodied in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which prohibited states from interfering with the rights of 
citizens or any inhabitant to due process and equal protection.  Yet 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1757. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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secession truncates the rights of national citizenship for any citizens who 
remain in the state.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment, states do not 
have the power to impair these rights of national citizenship, and section 
5 of the Amendment explicitly gives Congress the power to take any 
necessary action to deal with the situation.131    
D. Citizenship and the Slaughterhouse Cases 
When it came time for the Supreme Court to interpret the 
Reconstruction Amendments, the significance of national citizenship 
was not overlooked.  The appellants in the Slaughterhouse Cases argued 
that: 
The doctrine of the “States-Rights party,” led in modern times by Mr. 
Calhoun, was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United States, 
except sub modo and by the permission of the States.  According to 
their theory the United States had no integral existence except as an 
incomplete combination among several integers.  The fourteenth 
amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all such doctrines. . . . By 
it the national principle has received an indefinite enlargement.  The tie 
between the United States and every citizen in every part of its own 
jurisdiction has been made intimate and familiar.132 
This argument reflected a clear understanding of how the Fourteenth 
Amendment solidified the bond between citizens and the national 
government. 
Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Stephen Field also clearly 
articulated the import of the amendment for national citizenship and its 
accompanying rights.  He began by demonstrating his awareness of the 
past confusion on this topic: 
  The first clause of this amendment determines who are citizens of 
the United States, and how their citizenship is created.  Before its 
enactment there was much diversity of opinion among jurists and 
statesmen whether there was any such citizenship independent of that 
of the State, and, if any existed, as to the manner in which it originated.  
With a great number the opinion prevailed that there was no such 
citizenship independent of the citizenship of the State.  Such was the 
opinion of Mr. Calhoun and the class represented by him.133  
 
 131. Section 5 provides that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 132. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1872). 
 133. Id. at 94. 
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After recounting the holding in Dred Scott, Field explained how the 
Fourteenth Amendment settled the question of who possessed 
citizenship as well as of the significance of citizenship as a source of 
rights: 
 The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole 
subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. . . .  A 
citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States residing in 
that State.  The fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which 
belong to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a 
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship 
of any State.134 
Of course, the views of the advocates and the dissent are less 
significant than the view of the majority.  While the majority opinion 
rejects the sweeping vision of national rights advocated by Fields and 
respondent’s attorneys, it reflects a clear understanding of the primacy of 
national citizenship and of the fact that this citizenship carries with it 
genuine rights.135   
Like the dissent, the majority opinion displays an awareness of the 
pre-War confusion regarding citizenship.  Justice Samuel Miller 
recounted the antebellum disputes about citizenship.  First, he said, there 
was confusion over the status of individuals born within the United 
States but not in any state: 
It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the 
United States, except as he was a citizen of one of the States 
composing the Union.  Those, therefore, who had been born and 
resided always in the District of Columbia or in the Territories, though 
 
 134. Id. at 95.  
 135. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868), also tangentially touches upon citizenship.  In the first 
half of the decision, the Court held that Texas never seceded from the United States:  “The 
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible 
States.”  Id. at 725.  In considering whether the actions of Texas rebel legislature were valid, the 
Court held that citizens’ individual obligations to the Constitution were pre-eminent over their 
obligations to their state: 
Obligations often remain unimpaired, while relations are greatly changed.  The 
obligations of allegiance to the State, and of obedience to her laws, subject to the 
Constitution of the United States, are binding upon all citizens, whether faithful or 
unfaithful to them; but the relations which subsist while these obligations are performed, 
are essentially different from those which arise when they are disregarded and set at 
nought.  And the same must necessarily be true of the obligations and relations of States 
and citizens to the Union. . . . The government and the citizens of the State, refusing to 
recognize their constitution obligations, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred 
the consequences of rebellion.  
Id. at 727. 
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within the United States, were not citizens.  Whether this proposition 
was sound or not had never been judicially decided.136 
More significant, however, was the issue of black citizenship.  Dred 
Scott was not forgotten: 
But it had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Scott case, 
only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of 
African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a 
citizen of a State or of the United States.  This decision . . . had never 
been overruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional 
limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who had 
recently been made freemen, were still, not only not citizens, but were 
incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amendment to the 
Constitution.137 
Justice Miller explained how the Citizenship Clause resolved these 
issues: 
The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at 
rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of 
differences of opinion.  It declares that persons may be citizens of the 
United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, 
and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born 
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the 
United States.138 
Miller then listed some privileges and immunities of national citizenship 
that are protected against state interference.  The rights on his list are, at 
least today, quite uncontroversial, but we should keep in mind that a 
state’s secession would have deprived each of its citizens of every right 
on the list except to the extent that some later treaty might allow 
foreigners from the seceded state to exercise these rights.  Justice 
Miller’s list included the following: 
• “[T]he right of the citizen of this great country, protected 
by implied guarantees of its Constitution, ‘to come to the 
seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon 
that government, to transact any business he may have with 
it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in 
administering its functions.  He has the right of free access 
to its seaports, through which all operations of foreign 
 
 136. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72-73. 
 137. Id. at 73. 
 138. Id. 
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commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries, land offices, 
and courts of justice in the several States.’”139 
• “Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to 
demand the care and protection of the Federal government 
over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or 
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government.”140 
• “The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are 
rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution.”141 
• “The right to use the navigable waters of the United States, 
however they may penetrate the territory of the several 
States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with 
foreign nations, are dependent upon citizenship of the 
United States, and not citizenship of a State.”142 
• “[A] citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, 
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bonâ fide 
residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of 
that State.143 
• “To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth 
and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other 
clauses of the fourteenth.”144 
Most of these rights relate to American nationhood—the citizen’s 
connection with the federal government and the right to recognition of 
national citizenship by every state.  Secession would obviously interfere 
with these rights—for instance, no longer would citizens of another state 
retain the right to enter and become citizens of the seceded state or to use 
the navigable waters in that state, nor would the citizens of the seceded 
state retain their rights as American citizens.  The Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that no 
state has the power to deprive U.S. citizens within its borders of these 
rights. 
 
 139. Id. at 79. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 79-80. 
 143. Id. at 80. 
 144. Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
School children today pledge allegiance “to the flag of the United 
States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, 
under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”  Much of 
constitutional import is captured by this pledge:  that allegiance is to the 
United States as “one nation,” not a confederation; that the nation is 
“indivisible,” not subject to being divided by secession; and that all of 
this is tied with a national guarantee of “justice for all,” which is to say 
protection of the rights of individuals.   
Before the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, none of this 
could have been said with complete assurance.  Southerners, and a 
significant number of Northerners, would have thought it more correct 
for the pledge to refer to the flag and “to the republics for which it 
stands, one Confederation, divisible at the will of any state, with liberty 
and justice for all white men.”  
This hypothetical pledge would have encapsulated the Southern 
constitutional vision for the benefit of school children.  Prior to the Civil 
War, the state governments were primarily responsible for meeting the 
basic needs of American citizens.  The national government had little 
impact on the daily lives of most Americans.  Consequently, before the 
war, state citizenship was usually paramount in practical importance, 
and arguably of paramount legal importance as well.  From this premise, 
it was a small step to the conclusion that allegiance to the state came 
before allegiance to the federal government, as Southerners like Robert 
E. Lee reluctantly decided.  But such concepts obviously could not 
survive the Civil War, a war fought in large part over the primary 
allegiance of the citizen.  The decision to defeat secession by force 
necessarily implied that the citizen’s relationship to the national 
government took precedence over his or her relationship to the state.   
How far we have come from the antebellum Southern view of the 
Union was illustrated recently during former Governor Sarah Palin’s bus 
tour.  Although Palin is no friend of federal power,145 her bus touts the 
indivisibility of the American Republic:  “You’ll never guess the colors 
of the Palin bus.  In huge letters it has the closing Pledge of Allegiance 
line:  ‘One nation, under God, indivisible with liberty and justice for all.’  
Plus an image of the Declaration of Independence with the words ‘We 
 
 145. See, e.g., Robert Faturechi, Palin takes jabs, makes no promises, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 
2011, at AA2 (Palin delivers “searing critique of big government”). 
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the people.’”146  “Indivisible,” of course, means that the nation cannot be 
divided through secession.  
Given the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that today’s pledge is 
correct:  we owe our primary allegiance to the United States, which is a 
nation rather than a confederation, and which in return offers us 
protection for our rights as citizens.  Correspondingly, states, as building 
blocks of the nation, have only second place in our allegiance with state 
citizenship being defined by the Fourteenth Amendment as only a 
geographic marker depending on where an American citizen happens to 
reside at any given time. 
Today, then, there would be no doubt about the choice facing a 
modern-day Robert E. Lee.  He could live up to his obligations as a 
citizen of the “indivisible” United States.  Or, by joining an 
unconstitutional armed rebellion, he could attempt to assist a state in 
destroying the privileges and immunities of national citizenship for its 
own residents.  In using force on behalf of this effort, he would have to 
make war against the United States and give aid and comfort to the 
enemy.  For him to claim that his primary allegiance was to his home 
state rather than the national government would be to profoundly 
mistake the nature of the post-Civil War constitutional order.  In Lee’s 
time, perhaps there was some basis for good faith confusion on this 
point, but after the Civil War and the Fourteenth Amendment, there can 
be no question about the unconstitutionality of secession. 
 
 146. Andrew Malcolm, Sarah Palin and her ‘One Nation’ bus tour, coming to a town near 
voters soon, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2011/05/sarah-
palin-bus-tour-memorial-day-.html. 
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